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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the regulatory and supervision framework and 
the productivity of banks in 22 countries over the period 1999-2006. We follow a semi-
parametric two-step approach that combines Malmquist index estimates with bootstrap 
regressions. The results indicate that regulations and incentives that promote private 
monitoring have a positive impact on productivity. Restrictions on banks’ activities relating 
to their involvement in securities, insurance, real estate and ownership of non-financial firms 
also have a positive impact. However, regulations relating to the first and second pillars of 
Basel II, namely capital requirements and official supervisory power do not appear to have a 
statistically significant impact on productivity.    
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1. Introduction  
 
The important functions performed by banks and the implications for financial stability and 
economic growth have resulted in a heavily regulated and supervised industry. At an 
international level, the most renowned example is probably the new capital adequacy 
framework (Basel II) that encompasses capital requirements (Pillar 1), supervision by 
monetary authorities (Pillar 2), and market discipline (Pillar 3). While a host of international 
organisations, such as the Basel Committee, the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund promote reform programmes combined with such revised regulatory frameworks in 
many emerging markets, a growing number of studies suggest that there is no consensus as to 
what constitutes good regulation and supervision, or how specific regulations influence the 
performance and stability of the banking sector (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of various 
policies on bank performance (see e.g. Barth et al., 2004a, 2007a), while there is still only 
limited cross-country empirical evidence on what type of regulations and supervisory 
practices promote bank development and stability or facilitate efficient corporate finance 
(Barth et al., 2004a; Beck et al., 2006, Berger et al, 2008).  
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of (i) regulatory and supervisory 
policies related to the three Pillars of Basel II and (ii) restrictions on bank activities, on total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth in banking.1 Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) in their study 
of Spanish savings banks highlight how deregulation can have a negative influence on bank 
productivity while Casu et al. (2004) illustrate the importance of analysing the productivity 
of banks although they note that there is little consensus as to the main sources of 
productivity change. Various country studies, (Worthington, 1999; Mukherjee et al., 2001; 
Tirtiroglu et al., 2005; and Isik, 2007), examine the determinants of bank productivity with 
varying results. Mukherjee et al. (2001), for example, finds that US banks located in different 
states do not exhibit differences in productivity growth, and Worthington (1999) also finds 
no difference in the productivity of banks located in different parts of Australia. These results 
suggest that differences in local / regional economic and regulatory environments do not 
influence bank productivity. Tirtiroglu et al. (2005) examines the impact of U.S. intrastate 
                                                 
1 A recent group of studies has examined the impact of these regulations on the risk-taking behaviour of banks 
(Gonzalez, 2005), bank soundness as measured by credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2008), stability and banking sector crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Barth et al., 2004a; Beck et 
al., 2006), performance as measured by financial ratios (e.g. Barth et al., 2002, 2003a; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2004; Barth et al., 2007a) and efficiency (Pasiouras, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, no study has focused 
on whether they influence the productivity growth of banks. 
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and interstate deregulations on bank TFP growth and finds that intrastate branching 
liberalization had a positive long-run impact on productivity growth. Isik (2007) examines 
financial reform programmes that took place in Turkey during the 1980’s and finds that the 
productivity of banks improved significantly as the reform process accelerated. Similar 
results were also found by Aysan and Ceyham (2008) who examined Turkish banking sector 
reforms post 2001. 
The aforementioned literature provides some indication that deregulation may help 
explain bank productivity growth although there are noticeable single country exceptions 
(Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996) as well as a paucity of cross-country evidence to support 
such an idea. It is also by no means certain that a country-specific experience will necessarily 
apply to other countries (Barth et al., 2004a). Consequently, the present analysis attempts not 
only to relate bank productivity to a number of determinants, but also to shed some light on 
the productivity-regulations nexus within an international setting. As Casu et al. (2004) state: 
“Analysing productivity differences across countries may help to identify the success or 
failure of policy initiatives...” (p. 2522). Barth et al. (2005) also suggest that while lessons 
from individual countries, along with theoretical insights and the expertise of supervisory 
authorities provide important implications for the formation of banking policies, information 
on how different countries regulate banks and assess what works best (i.e. through empirical 
studies), is also crucial in determining appropriate policy reforms. Thus, by examining the 
productivity features of 533 banks operating in 22 transition countries over the period 1999-
2006, we aim to contribute to the established literature on bank TFP growth and the influence 
of different regulatory and supervisory regimes.  
The spotlight is placed on transition countries, which have received increased 
attention in recent years due to the important changes that they have experienced.2 One of the 
most important reforms in the financial sector of these countries has been the attempt to 
improve the regulatory framework. In the words of Fries and Taci (2002) “…the state had to 
take on important new roles to provide effective prudential regulation and supervision of 
banks. This involved development of significant new state capacity in terms of the enactment 
of new banking laws and regulations and their effective enforcement by the supervisory 
authorities and the courts” (p. 1). However, the speed and progress of these reforms differs 
from one country to another, while the variation in the regulatory framework across countries 
                                                 
2 For example, a number of empirical studies have examined the efficiency (e.g. Bonin et al., 2005; Fries and 
Taci, 2005) and the risk-taking behaviour of banks (e.g. Haselmann and Wachtel, 2007) in these countries.  
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is still quite important.3 Furthermore, despite the apparent success of recent financial sector 
reforms, financial supervision and other regulatory policies need to be further upgraded 
(Maechler et al., 2007). Consequently, these countries provide an excellent cross-country 
setting for our study.   
 In order to investigate the determinants of banking sector productivity we combine 
the recent methodologies of Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007). In 
particular, we adopt a semi-parametric two-stage approach for our empirical analysis, which 
(i) corrects for the problematic issue of using productivity scores obtained from linear 
programming methods as dependent variables and (ii) accounts for the potential endogeneity 
of some of the explanatory variables in the second stage of the analysis. To estimate total 
factor productivity growth (TFP) of banks we use the Malmquist index and in the second 
stage we explain productivity growth by variables related to capital requirements, official 
supervisory power, market discipline, and restrictions on bank activities, while controlling 
for country- and bank-specific characteristics. The results suggest that regulations and 
policies that promote private monitoring have a positive impact on productivity. 
Furthermore, restrictions on bank activities relating to securities, insurance, real estate and 
ownership of non-financial firms, also increase bank productivity. In contrast, capital 
requirements and official supervisory power do not appear to have a statistically significant 
impact on TFP growth.    
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the background 
of regulation and supervision and its potential relationship with productivity. Sections 3 and 
4 present the empirical methodology, data, and variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results and, finally, Section 6 concludes the study.   
 
2. Background – Regulation and bank productivity 
 
Banking regulations have attracted both theoretical and empirical interest, and several 
studies attempt to assess whether and how the regulatory framework influences the 
performance and behaviour of banks. The release of Basel II has generated a lively 
discussion and, while around 100 countries are currently planning to adopt the new 
framework by 2015, there is still an on-going debate as to its costs and benefits (Herring, 
                                                 
3 For example, Totev (2007) discusses the frameworks in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and concludes that there are important differences in the national legislation relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of banking business and the degree of implementation of Basel II. 
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2005). In the following sub-sections, we review the literature that examines the impact of 
certain regulatory features related to restrictions on bank activities and the three Pillars of 
Basel II on various aspects of performance, such as profitability, efficiency, soundness and 
risk-taking as this provides a guide as to their potential impact on bank productivity. 
However, it should be emphasised that in view of the general lack of empirical evidence on 
the influence of regulation on productivity and the mixed results of the literature that 
considers other measures of performance, the expected impact of regulations on productivity 
is ambiguous.   
 
2.1. Capital requirements  
 
To the extent that bank productivity is related to the transformation of inputs like deposits to 
outputs like loans, capital requirements may affect productivity through various channels.4 
The first channel is through the impact of capital requirements on bank lending, which is 
generally supported by the theoretical literature. For example, Kopecky and VanHoose 
(2006) argue that capital requirements influence bank decision-making in terms of both the 
quantity of lending and the quality of the loans made. Their theoretical model illustrates that 
the introduction of binding regulatory capital requirements on a previously unregulated 
banking system reduces aggregate lending, while loan quality may either improve or worsen. 
The analysis of Thakor (1996) also indicates that aggregate lending declines. However, 
VanHoose (2007) suggests that, in the long-term, capital regulation will increase capital 
ratios, which may or may not be accompanied by an increase in total lending. As regards the 
quality of loans and since screening and monitoring is costly, additional resources (i.e. 
inputs) will be required both in monetary and labour terms to ensure that banks operate 
within the desired level of risk.  
The second channel works through the impact of capital requirements on the decision 
of banks as for the assets in which they invest. VanHoose (2007) reviews the literature and 
suggests that in light of stricter capital standards, banks may decide to substitute loans with 
alternative forms of assets. Thus, banks will switch from relatively risky assets to those with 
lower risk weighting, such as residential mortgages, short-term interbank exposures, or 
government securities (Jackson et al., 1999). For example, Thakor (1996) argues that in a 
competitive environment, an increase in the minimum capital requirement will result in 
                                                 
4 See Santos (2001) and VanHoose (2007) for surveys of studies on capital requirements.  
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higher loan-funding cost and lower profit from lending, since the bank is unable to pass this 
cost to borrowers. Thus, lending will be less attractive relative to investing in government 
securities, which do not require capital to be held against them. However, the mix of assets 
can have a substantial impact on productivity, if banks are not equally efficient in managing 
various categories of assets.  
Productivity can also be influenced through the impact of capital requirements on the 
liability side of banks’ balance sheets. This is based on the fact that deposits and equity may 
be alternative sources of funds for banks. However, because capital is more expensive than 
deposits, banks will generally choose to operate with the minimum capital level specified by 
regulators (Santos, 1999). Nevertheless, banks may be forced to substitute equity for deposits 
and issue new equity to meet capital adequacy requirements. Indeed, Santos (2001) points 
out that even though an increase in capital standards may improve bank stability, it may not 
be desirable since it decreases deposits. Obviously, this decrease in the level of deposits can 
have an impact on productivity. Furthermore, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) outline that in the 
case of the above scenario, where banks issue new equity, agency problems may arise, as it is 
likely that insiders (i.e. existing shareholders) will become less productive monitors. 
Differently phrased and from a corporate governance perspective, less monitoring may lead 
managers to allocate funds less efficiently.5  
The empirical evidence on the influence of capital on bank efficiency provides some 
guidance as to whether solvency influences features of bank productivity. For example, 
regulators may allow relatively efficient banks to operate with higher leverage, all other 
things being equal (Hughes and Moon, 1995; Hughes and Mester, 1998). Hughes et al. 
(2001) find that when capital is included in cost functions to derive scale economies, this 
generally has a positive influence in terms of generating returns to scale (constant returns 
tend to be found when capital is excluded from their cost function estimates). Others, such as 
Altunbas et al. (2000), Färe et al. (2004) and Altunbas et al. (2007) also find that capital can 
significantly influence bank cost and profit efficiency measures. Altunbas et al. (2007) in 
their cross-country study of European banks, for instance, find that relatively inefficient 
banks appear to hold more capital, while evidence from the other literature is mixed. While 
this literature clearly indicates that capital influences bank efficiency it is difficult to 
extrapolate the expected direction of its influence on productivity, as it is very likely to 
                                                 
5 Caprio et al. (2007) suggest that if bank managers face sound governance mechanisms and are well-monitored, 
it is likely that they will allocate capital and the savings of the society more efficiently. Therefore, it is natural to 
assume than in a situation with less productive monitors, the opposite will occur.         
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depend on the relative changes of inputs and outputs in the production process over time.6
   
Related empirical research that focuses on other aspects of banks’ performance also 
seems to generate mixed findings. Barth et al. (2004a) find that while stringent capital 
requirements are associated with fewer non-performing loans, capital stringency is not 
robustly linked to banking sector stability, development or performance, when controlling for 
differences in regulatory regimes. Pasiouras et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between 
capital requirements and banks’ soundness as measured by Fitch ratings. In contrast, 
Pasiouras (2008) reports a positive association between technical efficiency and capital 
requirements, although this is not statistically significant in all cases.  
 
2.2. Supervisory power  
 
Under the official supervision approach, private agents may lack the incentives and 
capabilities to monitor powerful banks. However, powerful official supervision can improve 
the corporate governance of banks (Stigler, 1971). Consequently, as Beck et al. (2006) 
suggest, a supervisor that has the power to monitor and discipline banks could enhance their 
corporate governance, reduce corruption in bank lending and improve the functioning of 
banks as financial intermediaries.  
Yet, from another perspective, powerful supervisors may also try to maximize their 
own private welfare rather than the social welfare (see e.g. Becker, 1983). Barth et al. 
(2004a) summarize various reasons for which this can have a negative influence on bank 
performance. For example, politicians may use powerful supervisors to persuade banks to 
lend to favoured borrowers on advantageous terms. Furthermore, politicians and supervisors 
may use their power to benefit certain constitutes, attract campaign donations, and extract 
bribes (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2002). Obviously, when banks are forced under the threat of a 
non-compliant discipline to direct their credit to politically connected firms, they cannot use 
risk-return criteria (Beck et al., 2006). In addition, Levine (2003) mentions that powerful 
banks may, under the political/regulatory capture theory, confine politicians and induce 
supervisors to act in the interest of banks rather than the interest of the society (see e.g. 
                                                 
6 For example, in the case of a bank with a single input (deposits) and a single output (loans), under the 
assumption that loan activity decreases while deposits remain constant, we will observe a decrease in 
productivity. The opposite will occur with a decrease in deposits, when loans remain constant. In a more 
realistic scenario, both loans and deposits will change and the final impact on productivity will naturally depend 
on their relative change. Obviously, this situation becomes more complicated in the case of multiple inputs and 
outputs.  
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Stigler, 1971). Consequently, as Levine (2003) and Beck et al. (2006) argue, under these 
circumstances, enhancing the power of supervisors may result in a decrease in the integrity of 
bank lending with adverse implications on the efficiency of credit allocation. Levine (2003) 
highlights that the difference between the powerful official supervision approach and the 
political/regulatory capture theory is that the first will lead to an increase in the flow of credit 
towards a few well-connected firms, while the second will impair the availability of credit to 
firms in general.   
The empirical results are yet again mixed. Barth et al. (2004a) indicate that there is no 
strong association between bank development and performance and official supervisory 
power. However, the results of Barth et al. (2002) show that more powerful government 
supervisors are associated with higher levels of non-performing loans, while Barth et al. 
(2003b) find that official government power is particularly harmful to bank development in 
countries with closed political systems. The results of Pasiouras et al. (2006) also indicate a 
negative relationship between supervisory power and overall bank soundness (i.e. credit 
ratings). In contrast, after controlling for accounting and auditing requirements, Fernandez 
and Gonzalez (2005) report that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements 
a more stringent disciplinary capacity of supervisors over management action appears to be 
useful in reducing risk-taking. Furthermore, Pasiouras (2008) finds a positive and statistically 
significant impact of supervisory power on technical efficiency in most of his specifications. 
On the basis of the above discussion, it seems likely that the productivity of banks will be 
influenced by the power of the official supervisors, although, like in the case of capital 
regulation, it is again difficult to predict the precise direction of this relationship. 
 
2.3. Market discipline  
 
According to the private monitoring approach, regulations and incentives that promote 
private monitoring will result in better outcomes for the banking sector. For instance, this can 
be achieved by requirements related to the disclosure of accurate information to the public 
that will allow private agents to overcome information and transaction costs and monitor 
banks more effectively (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Furthermore, the existence or not of an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme7 and requirements to maintain subordinated debt finance8 
                                                 
7 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that several countries have established a system of national 
deposit insurance over the last 25 years, this being viewed as a way of avoiding bank runs. However, when 
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are expected to have an impact on private monitoring. The private monitoring approach also 
argues that corruption of bank officials will be less of a constraint on corporate finance (Beck 
et al., 2006). 
Thus, under the private monitoring empowerment view, we would expect that 
improved private governance of banks will boost their functioning (Barth et al., 2007a) and 
their productivity. However, requirements for increased disclosures can also have a negative 
impact on productivity. As Duarte et al. (2008) mention, disclosures are costly for managers 
due to direct costs of making additional disclosures, additional time, effort to prepare formal 
disclosure documents, and the costs of maintaining investor relations departments. 
Furthermore, Duarte et al. (2008) point out that broad disclosure may result in the release of 
sensitive information to competitors.  
Most of the empirical studies tend to support the view that market discipline will have 
a positive impact on the banking industry. Barth et al. (2004a) find that regulations that 
encourage and facilitate private monitoring of banks are associated with greater bank 
development and lower net interest margins and non-performing loans. Additional results 
from Barth et al. (2007a) indicate that private monitoring has a negative impact on overhead 
costs and enhances the integrity of bank-firm relations. Pasiouras (2008) reports a robust 
positive and significant relationship between disclosure requirements and technical 
efficiency. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) find that countries where banks have to report 
regular and accurate financial data to regulators and market participants have sounder banks. 
Finally, Beck et al. (2006) show that empowerment of private monitoring facilitates efficient 
corporate finance and has a beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries 
with sound legal institutions. However, Barth et al. (2004a) indicate that there is no evidence 
that regulations that foster private monitoring reduce the likelihood of suffering major 
banking crises. Furthermore, Pasiouras et al. (2006) find a negative relationship of credit 
ratings with disclosure requirements, which is however significant only at the 10% level and 
is not robust across their specifications. To this end, again we expect the productivity of 
banks to be related to the level of private monitoring although we cannot be certain ex ante 
whether this will have a positive or negative relationship. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
deposit insurance is in effect, depositors have no incentives to monitor banks, which may result in a decrease in 
market discipline (Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). 
8 See Calomiris (1999) and Evanoff and Wall (2000) for recent proposals under which requiring banks to 
maintain subordinated debt finance can be a promising reform that imposes market discipline and enhances 
safety nets.  
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2.4. Restrictions on bank activities 
 
Barth et al. (2004a) outline several reasons for restricting bank activities as well as reasons 
for allowing banks to participate in a broader range of activities. On the one hand, allowing a 
wide range of financial activities may lead to increased risk exposure of banks, or to the 
establishment of complex and powerful banks that will be difficult to monitor and discipline. 
Furthermore, the creation of large financial conglomerates may reduce competition and 
efficiency. On the other hand, fewer regulatory restrictions permit the utilization of 
economies of scale and scope (Claessens and Klingebiel, 2000), increase the franchise value 
of banks and offer opportunities for income diversification. 
Barth et al. (2004a) find a negative association between restrictions on bank activities 
and banking sector development and stability. Barth et al. (2001a) also confirm that greater 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with higher probability of suffering a 
major banking crisis, as well as lower banking sector efficiency. Lower restrictions on bank 
activities have also been associated with higher credit ratings (Pasiouras et al., 2006). In 
contrast, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) find that stricter restrictions on bank activities are 
effective at reducing banking risk, although the authors indicate that restrictions are only 
effective at controlling risk when information disclosure and auditing requirements are 
poorly developed. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) report a positive and significant association 
between net interest margins and restrictions on activities. Finally, Pasiouras (2008) finds no 
significant association of restrictions on activities with technical efficiency. Given the impact 
reported in the majority of the studies, we expect bank productivity to be influenced by 
restrictions on their activities, although the extent and direction of this influence is difficult to 
predict. 
 
3. Empirical methodology  
 
To examine the impact of regulations on the productivity growth of banks we combine the 
methodologies proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) and Khan and Lewbel (2007). 
Specifically, in a first stage of analysis, we derive input-oriented Malmquist indices to 
measure the TFP growth of banks. In the second stage, we regress these TFP growth scores 
on a number of variables (including the regulatory variables that are of central interest in this 
paper) using a bootstrapping procedure that accounts, inter alia, for the serial correlation of 
the first-stage estimates. This framework (denoted as Algorithm # 2 in Simar and Wilson) 
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provides a robust procedure for regressing non-parametrically derived efficiency/productivity 
scores on factors that potentially affect these scores.9 Note, however, that robustness is 
guaranteed as long as only exogenous determinants of productivity growth are considered in 
the second stage regressions. To account for the potential endogeneity of some of the right-
hand side variables (in particular the bank-level control variables), Brissimis et al. (2008) 
follow the methodology put forth by Khan and Lewbel (2007), who present an endogenous 
truncated regression model. Therefore, the simple truncated regression in Algorithm #2 of 
Simar and Wilson (2007) is replaced by the endogenous truncated regression of Khan and 
Lewbel (2007). Finally, note that productivity scores are derived on a country-specific basis, 
so as to avoid incorporating the effect of the different economic environments of our sample 
into the estimated scores.10
In this context, we use the Mamquist DEA-like method suggested by Fare et al. 
(1994), which is the most popular parametric method used to obtain TFP growth estimates.11 
To introduce some notation, let us assume that for N observations there exist K inputs 
producing L outputs. Hence, each observation n uses a nonnegative vector of inputs denoted 
1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
k
Kx x x x R+= ∈
L∈
 to produce a nonnegative vector of outputs, 
denoted . Production technology1 2( , ,..., )
n n n n
ly y y y R+= {( , ) :  can produce y}F y x x=  
describes the set of feasible input-output vectors, and the input sets of production technology 
 describe the sets of input vectors that are feasible for each output 
vector. TFP change is then estimated in the spirit of Fare et al. (1994), who defined the 
Malmquist index as 
( ) { : ( , ) }PT y x y x F= ∈
 
                                                 
9 As Simar and Wilson (2007) point out, non-parametrically derived efficiency/productivity estimates are 
serially correlated, and consequently standard approaches to inference in the second stage (such as censored or 
truncated regressions) are invalid. To overcome this problem, Simar and Wilson propose that two algorithms 
may be used in the second-stage regressions. Simulations reveal a preference for Algorithm #2, since it 
additionally corrects for bias in the estimated coefficients. The procedure starts with a simple truncated 
regression, whose estimates are corrected in a number of steps using bootstrapping (see pp 42-42 in Simar and 
Wilson, 2007). 
10We also estimated TFP for the pooled cross-country sample. The use of these TFP estimates in the second 
stage of our analysis had no significant impact on our results; the significance levels for the regulation variables 
remain more or less the same.  
11 The Malmquist technique allows decomposition of TFP change into technological change (TC) and technical 
efficiency change (TEC). An improvement in TC is considered as a shift in the frontier.  Also, TEC is the 
product of scale efficiency change (SEC) and pure technical efficiency change (PTEC). Note that this 
decomposition has been subject to a number of criticisms (see Casu et al., 2004), mainly in terms of the role of 
constant returns vs. variable returns to scale frontiers. However, there seems to be consensus that the Malmquist 
index is correctly measured by the constant returns to scale distance function, even when technology exhibits 
variable returns to scale.  
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               (1) 
 
where M0 measures the productivity change between periods s (base period) and t, and  
 represents the distance from the period t observation to the period s technology. 
M
0 ( , )
s
t td y x
0>1 indicates positive TFP growth from period s to period t, M0<1 indicates a decline and 
M0=1 indicates constant TFP growth. 
The TFP growth scores serve as the dependent variable in the estimation of the 
following equation: 
 
                                                1 2 3itc tc itc tcM a R a B a Z u= + + +     (2) 
 
where the TFP growth, M, of bank i that operates in country c at time t is written as a 
function of time-dependent banking-sector regulation variables, R; a vector of bank-level 
variables, B; variables that capture the macroeconomic conditions common to all banks, Z; 
and the error term u.  
 
4. Variables and data 
 
4.1. Inputs-outputs 
 
 We select inputs and outputs for the estimation of the Malmquist index on the basis of the 
intermediation approach, which assumes that banks collect funds, using labour and physical 
capital, to transform them into loans and other earning assets. To account for the increasing 
involvement of banks in fee-generating services, we also include non-interest income as an 
additional output. Thus, we assume that banks have three outputs, namely loans, other 
earning assets, and non-interest income. The three inputs used to produce the above outputs 
are fixed assets, customer deposits & short term funding, and overhead expenses.12    
 
                                                 
12 Most studies use personnel expenses rather than overhead expenses. However, owing to data unavailability 
for personnel expenses for a large number of observations in our sample, we rely on overhead expenses, which 
include personnel expenses and other administrative expenses. Our approach is consistent with the one of 
studies that examine the efficiency of banks in transition and other countries (see Altunbas et al 2001, Fries and 
Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005).   
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4.2. Regulatory variables 
 
For the construction of the capital requirements (CAPRQ), power of supervisory agencies 
(SPOWER) and private monitoring (PRMONIT) indexes, we use information provided by  
the World Bank database compiled by Barth et al. (2001b) and updated by Barth et al. (2006, 
2007b) that provides regulator responses to a broad number of questions.  
CAPRQ is an index of capital requirements that accounts for both initial and overall 
capital stringency. CAPRQ is constructed for each country in our sample, on the basis of the 
responses to the following eight questions documented in the aforementioned World Bank 
database: (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with market risk? (3-5) Before minimum capital adequacy 
is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book value of capital:  (a) 
market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in 
securities portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Are the sources of funds to 
be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial or 
subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
(8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? For each question, we 
add 1 if the answer is yes to questions (1)-(6) and 0 otherwise13, while the opposite occurs in 
the case of questions (7) and (8) (i.e. yes=0, no =1). Thus, CAPRQ can take values between 0 
and 8, with higher values indicating higher capital stringency.
SPOWER is an index that reveals the power of the supervisory agency in each 
country. It is constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 if the answer is no in the case 
of the following 14 questions: (1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with 
external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors 
required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 
(3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the 
                                                 
13 For the construction of CAPRQ, SPOWER and PRMONIT we use the summation of the quantified answers 
as in Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Barth et al. (2001b, 2004b, 2007b), Pasiouras et al. (2006), Pasiouras 
(2008), among others. An alternative would be to use the principal components approach as in Beck et al. 
(2006) and Barth et al. (2007a). Barth et al. (2004a) have followed both approaches. They mention that on the 
one hand the drawback of using the summation for the construction of the index is that it assigns equal weight 
to each of the questions, whereas on the other hand the disadvantage of the first principal component is that it is 
less transparent how a change in the response to a question changes the index. While they only report the 
empirical reports using the principal component indexes, they mention that “we have confirmed all this paper’s 
conclusions using both methods” (p. 218), implying that there are no differences in the results. Consequently, in 
the present study, we rely on the summation of the individual zero/one answers as we do not expect 
significantly different results.  
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supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) Are 
off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the 
bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 
(7) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute dividends? (8) Can 
the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute management fees? (10) Can the 
supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent? (11) Does 
banking law allow supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) to 
suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (12) Regarding bank restructuring 
and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than 
court) supersede shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can 
supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) remove and replace 
management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency or 
any other government agency (other than court) remove and replace directors? Thus, this 
index can take values between 0 and 14 with higher values indicating higher supervisory 
power. 
PRMONIT is an index of private monitoring that measures the degree to which banks 
are forced to disclose accurate information to the public and whether there are incentives to 
increase private monitoring. It is calculated by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions (1)-
(6) and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of questions (7) and (8) (i.e. yes=0, 
no =1). The eight questions that are considered are: (1) Is subordinated debt allowable (or 
required) as part of capital? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated 
accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance 
sheet items disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to 
public? (5) Are directors legally liable for erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do 
regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Does accrued, though unpaid 
interest/principal enter the income statement while loan is non-performing14? (8) Is there an 
explicit deposit insurance protection system? Hence, PRMONIT can take values between 0 
and 8 with higher values indicating higher private monitoring. 
Finally, ACTRS is a proxy for the level of restrictions on banks’ activities in each 
country. It is determined by considering whether participation in securities, insurance, real 
estate activities, and ownership of non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted 
                                                 
14 In cases that accrued but unpaid interest for a non-performing loan is allowed to enter the income statement it 
might be more difficult for market participants to assess the financial condition of a bank (Barth et al., 2007b).  
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or prohibited. Depending on the answer, the level of restrictions in each activity is quantified 
as 1 (unrestricted), 2 (permitted), 3 (restricted), or 4 (prohibited). We then construct an 
overall index by calculating the average value over all four activities. Consequently, ACTRS 
can take values between 1 and 4, with higher values indicating higher restrictions.  
 
4.3. Control variables 
 
 To control for other potential determinants of bank productivity, we use three bank-
specific and seven country-specific variables. The first bank-specific variable is the equity to 
assets ratio (EQAS) that is used as a proxy of capital strength. To control for size we use the 
natural logarithm of real total assets (LNAS). However, as there might be a non-linear 
relationship between size and productivity we also use the logarithm of the squared term of 
real total assets (LNAS2). Similar bank-specific control variables have been used in the 
studies of Isik (2007) and Aysan and Ceyhan (2008).     
Following previous studies that focus on banks’ performance (Barth et al., 2004a; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Fries and Taci, 2005; Pasiouras et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008), 
we control for cross-country differences in the national structure and competitive conditions 
of the banking sector, using the following measures: (i) concentration in terms of assets of 
the three largest banks (CONC3), (ii) percentage of assets held by foreign banks 
(FOREIGN), and (iii) percentage of assets held by government-owned banks (GOVERN). As 
in Kasman and Yildirim (2006) and Pasiouras (2008) (among others) we control for the 
macroeconomic environment using the real GDP growth (GDPGR) and the inflation rate 
(INFL). Finally, we control for the financial development and the overall economic 
development in each country by using the credit to the private sector expressed as a 
percentage of GDP (CREDIT) (e.g. Barth et al., 2003a; Pasiouras, 2008), and the GDP per 
capita (GDPCAP) (e.g. Barth et al., 2003a; Dermiguc-Kunt et al., 2004).       
 
 
4.4. Data  
 
Our panel is unbalanced and consists of 3,047 observations from 533 commercial banks 
operating in 22 transition countries between 1999 and 2006.15 We focus on commercial 
                                                 
15 The geographical coverage of the study is as follows: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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banks for two main reasons. First, because this provides a more homogenous sample in terms 
of services and consequently inputs and outputs, which in turn enhances the comparability of 
the banking systems examined. Second, as mentioned in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), since 
the regulatory data of the World Bank (WB) database are for commercial banks, it is more 
appropriate to use bank-level data only for this type of banks.  
We collect information from five sources. All bank-level data were obtained from the 
BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk and were converted to US dollars and in real 1995 
terms (using country-specific GDP deflators). Information on bank regulations and 
supervision is obtained from the World Bank database developed by Barth et al. (2001b) and 
updated by Barth et al. (2006, 2007b). Since this database is available at only three points in 
time we used information from Version I for bank observations for 2000, from Version II for 
bank observations for the period 2001-2003, and from Version III for bank observations for 
2004-2006.16,17 Data for concentration are collected from the 2007 version of the WB 
database on financial development and structure, which was initially constructed by Beck et 
al. (2000). Data for the percentage of assets held by foreign and government-owned banks, 
and the credit to the private sector (%GDP) are from the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Macroeconomic data are collected from Global Market Information 
Database.  
 Descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs used in the first stage of our analysis 
and the explanatory variables used in the second stage are available in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here] 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 3 reports geometric means for the total factor productivity change estimates by country 
and over time (obtained from the first stage of our empirical analysis). As already mentioned, 
an index greater than one indicates a positive TFP growth while an index lower than one 
                                                 
16 Version I was released in 2001 and contain information for 117 countries (Barth et al., 2001b). For most of 
the countries, information corresponds to 1999, while for others information is either from 1998 or 2000. 
Version II describes the regulatory environment at the end of 2002 in 152 countries (Barth et al., 2006) and 
Version III describes the regulatory environment in 142 countries in 2005/06 (Barth et al., 2007b).  
17 While acknowledging this shortcoming, we do not believe that it has an impact on our results. Many other 
studies that have used this database across a number of years worked under a similar assumption (e.g. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguck-Kunt et al., 2004; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). 
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indicates a decrease in TFP growth. The results suggest that during the sample period most 
countries present significant TFP growth on average, which is representative of banking 
systems under immense reform. In particular, average TFP growth has been quite large in 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Lithuania, while it has been declining in 
Armenia. Large fluctuations are observed in Serbia, which are probably due to the hostility in 
the beginning of the period, while a noticeable upward trend in the value of the index is 
observed for Slovenia and Hungary. Overall, the banking systems examined exhibit 
relatively high TFP growth scores compared with those reported by other studies for 
developed banking systems (e.g. Casu et al., 2004). 
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 Around Here] 
 
 As suggested above, Eq. (2) is estimated using the bootstrap procedure described in 
Brissimis et al. (2008), which accounts for the potential endogeneity of some of the right-
hand side variables, in our case the EQAS variable.18 The results of the second-stage analysis 
are reported in Table 4. We estimate various models, where we control for alternative 
country-specific factors. In all cases, we control for the bank-specific characteristics and for 
country effects using dummy variables.19 In particular, Model 1 is our base model where we 
examine the impact of regulations on productivity, while controlling for bank-specific 
characteristics. In Model 2, we additionally control for market structure by including 
CONC3, FOREIGN and STATE in the regression equation. In Model 3, we control for the 
macroeconomic conditions using INFL and GDPGR. In Model 4, we control for the financial 
and overall economic development through the inclusion of CREDIT and GDPCAP. As a 
robustness test, we also present two re-estimations of Model 1, in which we examine the 
potential impact of outliers and the effect of time, respectively.20  
 PRMONIT has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, and this finding 
holds across all of our specifications. Thus, our results strongly support the view that 
                                                 
18 The underlying theory of the potential endogeneity of bank capital in models of bank performance is outlined 
in detail in Berger (1995). 
19 The country dummies were found to be jointly statistically significant (using a simple F-test). For 
expositional brevity, we do not report the coefficients on these variables; however the results are available upon 
request.  
20 We examine the sensitivity of our results to outliers, by re-estimating our benchmark model, this time 
excluding all observations with an error term in the upper or lower 5th percentile (therefore, we drop 10% of 
our sample). The results remain practically unchanged at conventional levels of statistical significance. Also, to 
control for potential time effects we re-estimate our benchmark model while including year dummies. The 
inclusion of these dummies in the analysis does not alter the baseline results, while the joint significance of the 
year dummies (tested using an F-test) is quite low (p-value=0.17).  
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empowering private monitoring, through disclosure requirements and other incentives, 
increases the productivity of banks. On the other hand, CAPRQ and SPOWER are 
insignificant in all cases, indicating that higher capital requirements and more powerful 
supervisors do not influence the productivity of banks. Taken together, these results imply 
that transition, as well as developing countries aiming to enter in a transition stage, should 
place particular emphasis on enhancing private monitoring over the other pillars of Basel II, 
while upgrading their supervision and regulatory framework. This in turn will allow banks to 
increase productivity.21   
Our results indicate that ACTRS has a positive and significant impact on 
productivity, with the relationship being robust across all the specifications. Barth et al. 
(2003a) point out that on the one hand, fewer restrictions could provide greater profit 
opportunities; yet, on the other hand, banks may systematically fail to manage a diverse set 
of financial activities beyond traditional banking, and hence experience a lower profitability. 
Obviously, by interpolation, we can argue that those banks that fail to manage a diverse set of 
financial activities will also experience a decline in productivity. In other words, our results 
imply that banks may be forced to offer a limited number of services, so as to acquire 
expertise and specialization in specific market segments that will allow them to be more 
productive. This may be particularly true within banking systems of transition countries, as 
banks in these countries only recently gained access to modern technologies and improved 
the quality and training of their staff, which are necessary ingredients for an efficient 
expansion of intermediation services.22
Turning to the country-specific control variables, we find that only FOREIGN and 
CREDIT have a significant impact on productivity growth. Consistent with our expectations, 
FOREIGN has a positive sign, a result in line with the literature that suggests a number of 
benefits from the entry of foreign banks in emerging markets.23 For example, Levine (1996) 
mentions three major benefits from foreign banks presence: (i) improvement of quality and 
availability of financial services in the domestic market due to increased bank competition as 
well as adoption of modern banking skills and technology; (ii) development of the domestic 
                                                 
21 Note, that this finding is in line with the recommendations of studies that examine soundness (Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2008), efficiency (Pasiouras, 2008), corruption in lending (Beck et al., 2006) and other aspects of 
performance and development (Barth et al., 2004a). 
22As Bonin et al. (2005) suggest, until recently the information technology in transition countries was only 
basic, while the human capital necessary to make even prudent lending decisions and to price risk properly was 
sparse or non-existent. Kazandjieva (2007) also points out that in the past, private banks in Bulgaria were 
lacking knowledge and experience to develop new products. 
23See various articles in Altzinger and Petkova (2007) that discuss the benefits form the entry of foreign banks 
in South East European countries.  
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bank supervisory and legal framework; and (iii) enhancement of the country’s access to 
international markets. Furthermore, the presence of foreign banks may encourage non-
financial foreign firms to invest in the host country in the same way that foreign banks follow 
their customers abroad (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). Finally, Lensink and Hermes (2004) 
argue that foreign banks may also increase the quality of human capital in the banking 
system, either by importing high skilled bank managers to work in their branches or by 
training the local employees. CREDIT also carries a positive sign, indicating that financial 
development increases the productivity of banks, which is consistent with findings in the 
efficiency literature (e.g. Pasiouras, 2008).   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Despite the efforts of international organisations and policy makers to promote a regulatory 
framework with more stringent capital requirements, higher supervisory involvement and 
empowerment of private monitoring, there is an ongoing debate as for which of these 
regulations really work and whether policies that have proved successful in one country will 
also be successful in another. Theoretical answers to these questions have in general provided 
conflicting views, while researchers have only recently used cross-country  data to 
investigate aspects of banking regulation that were traditionally explored in individual-
country studies.  
 The present study, examines the relationship between bank-level productivity and 
country-level capital requirements, official supervisory power, market discipline and 
restriction on bank activities. We first use the Malmquist index to estimate the total factor 
productivity growth of 533 banks operating in 22 transition countries between 1999 and 
2006. Then, we use a robust bootstrap procedure to regress the first-stage TFP growth scores 
on our regulatory variables, while controlling for country- and bank-specific characteristics.  
   Our results suggest that from the three pillars of Basel II, only market discipline has 
an impact on productivity growth. This is consistent with the majority of studies that have 
explored other issues of bank performance, soundness, and risk taking. Therefore, our 
findings suggest that policy makers should direct their efforts towards ensuring adequate and 
timely disclosure of information and promote a framework that provides incentives for 
private monitoring. Certainly, this may not imply that the other two pillars of Basel II should 
be abandoned. There exist prominent theoretical arguments and a limited number of 
empirical studies that reveal a close relationship between regulations related to the first two 
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Pillars and mitigation of bank risk-taking, while policy makers report that such regulations 
are useful in ensuring the enforcement of private monitoring.  
Furthermore, we found that restrictions on bank activities had also a positive impact 
on productivity growth. While this contradicts the results of some studies on financial 
stability, it perhaps suggests that banks in transition countries that focus on core banking 
areas acquire knowledge and specialization in these services, enhancing their productivity. It 
may be the case that potential productivity gains are dissipated if banks are afforded greater 
opportunities to diversify.24  Finally, we found that the percentage of assets held by foreign 
banks and the credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP influenced positively the 
total factor productivity of banks. 
We contend that future research regarding the impact of regulations on bank 
performance in general and on productivity growth in particular may benefit from focusing 
on the structure and risks facing the banking industry or individual banks.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of bank inputs and outputs (country averages) 
Country ta dep fa over loans oea nintinc 
Albania 1669.8 100321.4 1851.8 3224.9 26127.0 74930.9 1312.5 
Armenia 263.1 13349.5 901.8 982.3 6056.6 6770.0 692.0 
Azerbaijan 431.8 21873.7 1796.0 1284.2 14932.0 5092.0 1369.9 
Belarus 24.9 1433.1 141.9 153.9 1194.7 286.6 103.3 
Bosnia 1907.6 103124.7 4943.4 5643.8 74060.9 33477.0 4030.7 
Bulgaria 111.3 7685.5 319.1 355.8 5018.9 3634.0 193.0 
Croatia 6763.2 378610.8 9560.7 13738.5 283114.2 176647.6 8530.5 
Czech 28144.7 1872211.0 43274.1 60033.3 932382.2 1309705.0 38405.0 
Estonia 11922.6 784478.6 12740.9 23931.4 717090.5 174867.1 16500.0 
FYROM 1255.9 68438.2 3842.9 3651.0 37593.4 35934.3 3305.5 
Georgia 401.7 18129.5 2070.6 2040.5 19262.9 4063.2 1344.1 
Hungary 9340.2 566448.3 12937.1 29064.2 403552.9 238327.2 20961.6 
Kazakhstan 2732.7 103727.4 2929.2 4849.1 134671.3 57398.2 3954.9 
Latvia 3425.0 250032.0 5464.8 8491.6 176240.0 106992.0 6357.6 
Lithuania 6641.4 488250.6 14816.8 17851.8 372559.8 188491.4 11136.2 
Moldova 166.4 9137.8 777.0 725.1 6709.4 3384.9 677.8 
Poland 13599.4 754397.0 19024.4 34765.9 472637.9 395066.8 27229.5 
Romania 374.2 24001.6 2228.8 1697.7 14620.7 9208.8 909.6 
Serbia 621.4 29584.6 2223.4 2828.2 22013.1 15987.2 3681.1 
Slovakia 11091.8 849096.5 26441.7 32071.7 405928.9 525442.0 17626.3 
Slovenia 12752.2 732174.0 20239.1 26154.8 561781.6 391392.9 16012.2 
Ukraine 811.8 42338.4 3197.5 2757.4 36204.7 8703.9 1897.3 
Total 5625.5 327033.0 8865.6 13220.2 209538.9 176080.6 9243.9 
Notes: ta: total assets, dep: deposits, fa: fixed assets, over : overheads, loans : loans, oea: 
other earning assets, nintinc: non-interest income 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of determinants of TFP change 
 
Country LNAS LNAS2 CAPRQ SPOWER PRMONIT ACTRS CONC3 STATE FOREIGN INFL GDPGR GDPCAP CREDIT 
Albania 6.549 0.130 4.000 11.701 4.026 2.321 73.439 34.122 63.719 2.645 5.597 1425.8 10.126 
Armenia 5.190 0.227 3.448 10.724 4.857 2.462 62.034 1.082 51.080 2.683 11.530 940.6 7.776 
Azerbaijan 4.863 0.259 5.137 9.975 5.124 2.933 82.111 57.092 5.257 6.050 13.812 1073.9 7.661 
Belarus 2.060 0.221 5.000 7.349 4.294 2.808 76.420 66.644 13.166 46.702 7.581 2031.4 12.529 
Bosnia 6.829 0.201 4.995 13.133 4.005 2.576 56.401 13.396 72.993 2.511 4.958 1542.1 14.658 
Bulgaria 3.950 0.168 6.566 11.143 5.000 2.389 51.255 8.794 77.491 6.302 5.172 1933.6 28.551 
Croatia 7.489 0.150 3.861 11.147 4.992 1.965 57.517 4.197 88.944 3.109 4.417 5480.0 52.539 
Czech 9.194 0.104 4.875 9.560 5.155 2.857 64.720 6.520 83.133 2.515 4.043 6694.5 34.777 
Estonia 7.497 0.191 4.408 13.184 5.408 1.704 97.625 0.022 97.173 3.782 9.229 5928.7 39.831 
FYROM 6.367 0.306 3.830 12.125 4.857 2.170 78.333 1.604 49.285 2.749 21.729 1926.4 2.266 
Georgia 5.450 0.242 3.039 11.039 4.000 2.250 67.317 0.100 43.490 6.103 6.857 759.3 11.304 
Hungary 8.108 0.127 5.986 14.000 5.281 2.675 62.484 7.958 75.616 6.188 4.408 5828.9 40.554 
Kazakhstan 6.742 0.202 5.994 10.976 3.869 2.896 67.184 3.506 21.525 8.066 10.311 2055.7 25.463 
Latvia 7.286 0.120 5.012 11.280 5.857 1.894 55.160 4.057 57.711 4.218 8.455 4484.0 39.896 
Lithuania 7.866 0.121 3.587 12.016 4.984 2.349 81.450 6.838 85.321 1.781 7.154 4120.7 23.621 
Moldova 4.691 0.256 6.286 12.152 4.438 2.828 69.090 14.569 32.107 13.425 5.947 383.3 19.798 
Poland 8.424 0.147 4.569 9.280 4.995 1.966 56.462 23.642 72.344 3.682 3.580 4795.1 28.861 
Romania 4.783 0.180 4.862 9.841 3.862 2.922 66.641 28.716 58.527 20.914 5.487 2184.3 14.562 
Serbia 5.692 0.261 5.000 6.020 3.996 2.001 51.811 41.377 37.525 32.727 5.069 2381.8 17.305 
Slovakia 8.567 0.098 5.018 13.170 4.304 2.571 78.204 8.641 84.384 6.529 4.573 4202.7 34.729 
Slovenia 8.842 0.104 6.558 12.701 5.857 2.568 64.828 21.892 19.757 5.703 3.812 10346.8 47.095 
Ukraine 5.884 0.161 5.000 12.000 5.000 1.750 49.094 10.253 16.585 11.073 7.404 952.6 24.088 
Total 6.589 0.174 4.975 10.880 4.763 2.340 62.297 17.450 52.992 9.622 6.702 3284.4 26.068 
Notes: LNAS: ln (real total assets); LNAS2: [ln (real total assets)]2; EQAS: equity/total assets; CAPRQ: capital requirements;  SPOWER: official supervisory 
power, PRMONIT: private monitoring; ACTRS: restrictions on bank activities; CONC3: 3-bank concentration; STATE: the market share of government-owned 
banks; FOREIGN: the market share of foreign-owned banks;  INFL: Inflation rate; GDPGR: Real GDP growth; GDPCAP: real gdp per capita; CREDIT: domestic 
credit to the private sector/GDP. 
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Table 3 
Estimates of TFP change (country geometric means) 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Albania 0.936 0.841 1.037 1.160 0.863 0.968 1.030 
Armenia 1.120 1.114 1.061 0.980 0.993 0.967 0.885 
Azerbaijan 1.113 0.780 1.039 1.174 0.905 0.962 1.033 
Belarus 1.021 0.807 1.098 1.015 0.946 1.061 1.003 
Bosnia 0.998 1.181 1.200 1.014 1.016 1.012 0.977 
Bulgaria 1.083 1.095 0.955 1.011 1.053 1.127 1.006 
Croatia 1.020 0.977 1.175 1.027 0.975 1.051 1.043 
Czech 1.096 1.374 1.149 1.312 0.911 1.218 1.080 
Estonia 1.073 1.114 0.954 1.196 1.002 1.089 1.375 
FYROM 1.275 0.935 0.993 1.003 1.025 1.160 1.039 
Georgia 1.143 0.912 0.886 1.039 0.966 1.255 1.014 
Hungary 0.960 1.092 1.006 1.044 1.070 1.083 1.169 
Kazakhstan 1.092 0.976 1.031 1.041 1.177 1.013 1.186 
Latvia 1.036 1.310 0.956 1.078 1.087 1.129 1.049 
Lithuania 1.154 1.226 1.145 1.286 0.834 1.011 1.137 
Moldova 1.003 0.985 1.138 1.061 1.046 1.028 0.968 
Poland 1.051 1.066 1.038 1.003 1.072 0.992 1.019 
Romania 0.984 1.056 1.006 0.988 1.054 0.919 0.963 
Serbia 1.502 0.787 0.707 0.770 1.264 0.954 1.036 
Slovakia 1.019 1.079 0.909 0.998 0.984 1.098 0.962 
Slovenia 0.984 0.992 1.081 1.039 1.126 1.156 1.103 
Ukraine 0.938 0.956 1.134 1.067 0.994 0.994 1.064 
Table 4 
Determinants of TFP change 
  Basic model Market structure Macroeconomic  conditions 
Economic & 
financial  
development 
 
 
Basic model 
without Outliers 
Basic model 
with Year 
dummies 
  Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
LNAS 0.029 1.94 0.030 1.98 0.015 1.94 0.015 1.89 0.015 1.97 0.030 2.01 
LNAS2 -0.002 -1.56 -0.002 -1.63 -0.001 -1.43 -0.001 -1.37 -0.001 -1.39 -0.002 -1.62 
EQAS 0.107 1.82 0.107 1.82 0.102 1.63 0.102 1.83 0.038 1.11 0.107 1.82 
CAPRQ 0.000 0.08 0.002 0.41 0.001 0.18 -0.002 -0.84 -0.001 -0.45 0.001 0.22 
SPOWER -0.002 -0.57 -0.002 -0.78 -0.003 -0.91 -0.002 -0.89 -0.001 -0.72 -0.003 -0.88 
PRMONIT 0.042 4.56 0.041 4.45 0.039 4.07 0.032 6.15 0.033 7.07 0.047 4.98 
ACTRS 0.035 2.33 0.033 2.19 0.035 2.34 0.027 3.38 0.023 3.03 0.039 2.62 
CONC3   0.011 0.26         
FOREIGN   0.049 2.31         
GOVERN   -0.014 -0.53         
INFL     -0.001 -1.19       
GDPGR     0.003 1.20       
GDPCAP       -0.021 -0.88     
CREDIT       0.066 2.08     
Constant 0.657 7.83 0.631 7.25 0.698 7.70 0.767 6.96 0.768 7.61 0.619 7.11 
year dum.           6.12 0.410 
sigma 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.160 0.160 0.328 
obs. 2514 2514 2514 2514 2270 2514 
wald 32.63 41.02 34.16 93.38 88.79 38.83 
Notes: LNAS: ln (real total assets); LNAS2: [ln (real total assets)]2; EQAS: equity/total assets; CAPRQ: capital requirements;  SPOWER: 
official supervisory power, PRMONIT: private monitoring; ACTRS: restrictions on bank activities; CONC3: 3-bank concentration; 
STATE: the market share of government-owned banks; FOREIGN: the market share of foreign-owned banks;  INFL: Inflation rate; 
GDPGR: Real GDP growth; GDPCAP: real gdp per capita; CREDIT: domestic credit to the private sector/GDP.; year dum.: a Wald test 
of the joint significance of year dummies and the associated p-value; sigma: the variance of the estimated equation; obs.: the number of 
observations; wald: the Wald test of the estimated equation; The Basic model without Outliers corresponds to a re-estimation of the basic 
model while excluding all observations with an error term in the upper or lower 5th percentile (therefore, we drop 10% of our sample). 
The Basic model with Year dummies corresponds to a re-estimation of the basic model with year dummies to control for potential time 
effects.  
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